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WHAT IS THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE?
Michael L. Perlin

L Introduction
The most important and exciting new jurisprudential insights
into mental disability law of the last two decades have come from the
development-primarily by two of the contributors to this
Symposium, David Wexler and Bruce Winick-of the construct of
"therapeutic jurisprudence." Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new
model by which we can assess the ultimate impact of case law and
legislation that affects mentally disabled individuals.
It studies the role of the law as a therapeutic agent,
recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers'
roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences,
and questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or

C Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journalof Hwnan Rights.
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University;
J.D.
Columbia University School of Law. This article is adapted from remarks prepared for
the New York Law School Symposium on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, April 23, 1993.
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should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential while
not subordinating due process principles.'
Therapeutic jurisprudence stems from a variety of sources.
First, recent changes in the judicial temperament have made it appear
that the seemingly endless expansion of civil rights decisions in cases
involving the constitutional and civil rights of mentally disabled
persons has come to a stuttering halt,2 and that federal courts could
no longer be looked to as the last bastion of patients' rights.'
Second, changes in the political and social climate (the residue of the
Reagan years) eliminated any sort of political consensus that might
have once supported the proposition that amelioration of the lives of
mentally disabled individuals was a positive social goal.4

See, e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
(David B. Wexler ed. 1990) [hereinafter LAW As AGENT]; ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS];
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992) [hereinafter Wexler, Mental Health];
1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRMINAL, § 1.05A
(Supp. 1993); Bibliographyof TherapeuticJurisprudence,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
915 (1993) (this issue).
2 Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the
Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?,20 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1249, 1261 (1987). See,
e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (holding due process and equal protection
are not violated by a statutory scheme providing heightened standard of review for
involuntary civil commitment based upon mental illness but a lesser standard of review
for commitments based on mental retardation); Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680
(1993) (holding standard for pleading guilty or for waiving counsel is no higher than for
determination of competency to stand trial). For a discussion of Heller, see 1 PERLIN,
supranote 1, §§ 3.29, 3.39A (Supp. 1993). For a discussion of Godinez, see 1 PERLIN,
supra note 1, §§ 14.20A, 14.21 (Supp. 1993). But compare, Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.
Ct. 1810 (1992) (holding forcible administration of antipsychotic medication during trial
over defendant's objection violates due process absent a showing of medical
appropriateness, an essential state interest in medicating the defendant, and that
medication is the least intrusive means of accomplishing that interest), discussed infra
note 12 and accompanying text, with Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992)
(continued confinement of insanity acquittee after a hospital determination that mental
illness no longer existed violates due process), discussed infra note 11 and accompanying
text.
I Wexler, Mental Health, supra note 1, at 29-31; John Petrila, Redefining Mental
Health Law: Thoughts on a New Agenda, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 89, 89-92 (1992).
" See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 65-66 (1991).
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Next, the development of more sophisticated behavioral and
empirical research began to shed some important light on the roots of
mental disability and the reasons for some previously-not-understood
behavior of mentally disabled persons.' Finally, the development of
other sophisticated schools ofjurisprudence (e.g., law and economics;
feminist jurisprudence; critical legal studies; critical race studies) has
begun to examine the entire legal system through a series of new and
critical lenses and filters.6
Therapeutic jurisprudence, then, looks at a variety of mental
disability law issues in an effort to both shed new light on past
developments and to offer new insights for future developments.
Recent articles and essays have thus considered such matters as the
insanity acquittee conditional release hearing, juror decisionmaking
in malpractice and negligent release litigation, competency to consent
to treatment, competency to seek voluntary treatment, standards of
psychotherapeutic tort liability, the effect of guilty pleas in sex
offender cases, the impact of scientific discovery on substantive
criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be executed. 7
In three recent essays, by way of example, I have tried to
apply this construct to Tarasoff issues,' to the development of right
to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment litigation, 9 and in a piece co-

S See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 648-54 (1989-1990);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994)
[hereinafter PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY].

6 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, The Invisible Renaissance
of Mental Disability Law Scholarship: A Case Study in Subordination (unpublished

manuscript, on file with the authors).
7 See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.05A, nn.156.6-156.24A (Supp. 1993).

1 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoffand the Dilemma of the DangerousPatient:
New Directionsfor the 1990's, 16 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 29 (1992) (discussing

Tarasoffv. Board of Regents, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (finding psychologist liable for
failing to protect potential victim of a dangerous patient)).
' See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1991) (reviewing the development of the right to refuse

medication); Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 151, 177 (1993) (tracing the development of case law with respect to
the right to refuse antipsychotic medication in various litigation settings) [hereinafter
Perlin, Decoding].
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authored with Deborah Dorfman,' 0 another contributor to this
symposium, ,to two recent United States Supreme Court cases
involving mentally disabled criminal defendants: Foucha v.
Louisiana" and Riggins v. Nevada. 2 In a book that has just been
published, I apply these constructs to both substantive and procedural
aspects of the insanity defense. 13
This list should suggest the broad scope of substantive and
procedural mental disability law topics to which therapeutic
jurisprudence can be applied, but should also trigger thoughts about
other areas of potential scholarly study as well. While these are fresh,
stimulating and provocative ideas, at least two caveats need to be
added to any therapeutic jurisprudence analysis.
First, and most importantly, it is clear that an inquiry into
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns
"trump" civil rights and civil liberties. David Wexler underscores this
in a recent article: the law's use of "mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice
concerns."' 4 Therapeutic jurisprudence does not, cannot and must not
mean, in Nicholas Kittrie's famous phrase, "a return to the

10

Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the

Development ofMentalDisabilityLaw Jurisprudence,11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 47, 5256 (1993). See also Michael L. Perlin, Law as a Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic
Agent, Address before Annual Conference of the Massachusetts Dep't of Mental
Health's Division of Forensic Mental Health (May, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
1 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (continuing indefinite confinement of insane acquittee
determined to be no longer mentally ill violates due process). See 3 MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.25A (Supp. 1993).
12112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992) (reversing a conviction in which a defendant's right to a
fair trial was compromised by the involuntary imposition of a high dosage of
antipsychotic medication). See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL § 5.65 (Supp. 1993); Michael L. Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced
Medication Collides With the Right to a FairTrial, 17 NEWSL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 81, 81 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Forced Drugging and Fair Trial Rights:
UnderstandingRiggins v. Nevada, 1 CRIM. PRAC. L. REP. 33, 34 (1993).
13See PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY, supra note 5, at ch. 9.

14David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Changing Concepts of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See David B. Wexler, New
Directionsin TherapeuticJurisprudence:Breaking the Bounds of Conventional Mental
Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. RTs. 759 (1993) (this issue) [hereinafter
Wexler, New Directions].
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therapeutic state." 5 Consideration of therapeutic jurisprudence issues
cannot be used as an excuse to return to the days of the 1950's when
courts were comfortable simply with a "hands off" policy toward
institutionalized persons. 6
Also, familiarity with therapeutic jurisprudence cannot be
limited to the worlds of the small circle of law professors and
academic psychologists writing in this area.7
If therapeutic
jurisprudence is to be meaningful, there must be a concentrated
outreach to members of the practicing bar, to frequent forensic
witnesses, and to clinicians.
Most importantly, therapeutic
jurisprudence must consider the perspective of clients and consumers
of mental health services. 8 In this way, those who are involved in
" See generally NICHOLAS KrrrRIE: THE RIGHT TO BE DIFERENT: DEVIANCE AND
ENFORCED THERAPY (1971) (criticizing "therapeutic state").
6 See generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.03 (discussing the federal courts'

abandonment of the "hands off" doctrine and the resulting consequences for the rights
of the mentally disabled); Perlin, supra note 2, at 1249-50 (discussing the gradual
abandonment of the "hands off' doctrine). For standard articulations of the doctrine, see
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th Cir. 1954) ("Courts are without power to
supervise prison administration or interfere with ordinary prison rules or regulations."),
cert. denied., 348 U.S. 854 (1954); Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950)
("The Government of the United States is not concerned with, nor has it the power to
control or regulate the internal discipline of the penal institutions of its constituent
states."). See Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(questioning the constitutional underpinnings of the right of incarcerated prisoners to
medical care articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and wistfully longing
for a return to a pre-Estelle approach).
11For a broad spectrum of opinions from various disciplines see LAW AS AGENT,
supra note 1; ESSAYS, supra note 1; Norman G. Poythress & Stanley L. Brodsky, In the
Wake of a Negligent Release Law Suit: An Investigation of ProfessionalConsequences
and InstitutionalImpact on a State PsychiatricHospital, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 155
(1992); Robert F. Schopp, The Psychiatrist's Duty to Protect the Public: The
Appropriate Standardand the Foundation in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70
NEB. L. REV. 327 (1991); Keri A. Gould, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Arraignment Process; The Defense Attorney's Dilemma: Whether to Request a
Competency Evaluation?, 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 1994); Daniel W.
Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Tort Law: A Limited Subjective Standard of
Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409 (1992).
"8See, e.g., Julie Magno Zito et al., Toward a TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis
ofMedicationRefisal in the CourtReview Model, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 151 (1993)
(seeking patients' perspectives on refusal of medication decisionmaking); Deborah A.
Dorfman, Through a TherapeuticJurisprudenceFilter:Fearand Pretextuality in Mental
Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 805 (1993) (this issue) (applying
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or are the subjects of litigation dealing with mentally disabled
individuals can share their insights into how the therapeutic, antitherapeutic or atherapeutic aspects of the justice system actually play
out.19 Those of us who write in this field can and must learn from
them.20
One example should do. Fourteen years ago, John Ensminger
and Thomas Liguori, then colleagues in the New Jersey Division of
Mental Health Advocacy, wrote a piece on the therapeutic aspects of
the civil commitment process, an essay reprinted in Professor
Wexler's first collection of therapeutic jurisprudence essays. 21 No
other piece written in the intervening fifteen years has significantly
built on their insights about how the commitment process actually
works, what effect it has on the individuals subject to commitment,
and how state hospital employees respond to the litigation process.22
Additional involvement of both legal and mental health practitioners

therapeuticjurisprudence to patients' perspectives on commitment and medication refusal
decisionmaking).
19See, e.g., John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 877 (1993) (book review)
(this issue) (critiquing therapeutic jurisprudence for failing to adequately consider this
perspective).
o Indeed, there is a wide array of other perspectives that therapeutic jurisprudence
has already begun to take account. See Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time
for Uncharged,Dismissed or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Promote Respectfor the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (this issue) (criminal
defendants); Daniel W. Shuman et al., "The Health Effects of Jury Service"
(unpublished manuscript; on file with the author); Bruce Feldthusen, Discriminatory
Damage Quantification in Civil Actions for Sexual Battery, 44 U. TORONTO L.J.
(forthcoming 1994) (civil tort victims); Poythress & Brodsky, supra note 17 (mental
health professionals at state psychiatric institutions). These and similar investigations
must continue in the future.
21John J. Ensminger & Thomas Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil
Commitment Hearing, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978), reprinted in LAW AS AGENT,
supra note 1, at 245.
2 For two other important perspectives on the question, compare Paul Appelbaum,
Civil Commitment From a Systems Perspective, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 61 (1992)
(suggesting a new functionally independent system to assume all civil commitment
responsibilities now shared by mental health and judicial systems) with Joel Haycock et
al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil
Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J. CIV. & CRIM. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 1993)
(suggesting the use of mediation as an alternative means of resolving involuntary civil
commitment cases).
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in the therapeutic jurisprudence enterprise would help insure that
there are meaningful "real world" results from any academic efforts
in this field.
Again, it is essential that therapeutic jurisprudence incorporate
the viewpoints and perspectives of the eventual consumers of mental
health services-those who 'involuntarily and voluntarily' enter the
mental health system. There is now a vibrant and growing body of
literature by former recipients of mental health services. 24 For years,
the mental health system and the judiciary have ignored this
perspective, 25 a willful blindness that is even more perplexing in light
of Professor Tom Tyler's findings that perceptions of systemic
fairness are driven, in large part, by "the degree to which people

See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (voluntary patient could
proceed with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages action against state hospital officials for
allowing him to sign voluntary admissions forms at a time when they should have known
he was incompetent to do so).
24 See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.03 at 8 n.34 & Supp. 1994 at 1-2; Symposium,
Challenging the Therapeutic State: Critical Perspectives of Psychiatry and the Mental
Health System, 11 J.MIND & BEHAV. 1 (1990).
15See generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373 (1992)
(discussing how prevailing prejudices and reliance on stereotypical "isms" pervade
society's attitudes towards the mentally ill and adversely affect rational discussion of
mental health problems) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]; Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and
Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1993)
(discussing pretextual nature of expert testimony and judicial decisionmaking in
involuntary civil commitment and incompetency to stand trial cases) [hereinafter Perlin,
Pretexts]; Eric Turkheimer & Charles D. Parry, Why The Gap? Practice and Policy in
Civil Commitment Hearings,47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646 (1992) (considering empirical
studies of civil commitment hearings in the context of broad changes that have affected
national mental health policy); Charles D..Parry et al., A Comparison of Commitment
and Recommitment Hearings: Legal and Policy Implications, 15 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 25 (1992) (reporting an empirical study showing that, as length of
hospitalization increases, judges more rarely inform patients of their right to appeal or
counsel). For a rare judicial exception, see Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1306
(D.N.J. 1979) (citing Van Putten & Ray, Subjective Response as a Predictorof Outcome
in Pharmacotherapy,35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 480 (1978) ("Schizophrenics
have been asked every question except, 'How does the medication agree with you?'
Their response is worth listening to."), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated
& remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
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judge that they are treated with dignity and respect. 2 6 The next
generation of therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship must incorporate
these perspectives.27
I need also emphasize that I do not believe that consideration
of therapeutic jurisprudential values should end new inquiries into the
behavior of the mental disability law system. While the therapeutic
jurisprudence construct is an enormously useful one and an excellent
organizing tool, it does not answer all the questions before us. In
order to understand the motivations behind the responses of judges,
lawyers and litigators to the mental disability law system, it is also
necessary to examine the influence of what I call "sanism" and
"pretextuality."
"Sanism" refers to the irrational prejudices that cause (and are
reflected in) the prevailing social attitudes toward mentally disabled
persons and those so perceived.2" It infects our jurisprudence, our
lawyering practices, and our forensic practices. It is largely invisible
and largely socially acceptable. It is based upon stereotype, myth,
superstition and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated
by our false use of ordinary common sense (OCS) and heuristic
reasoning in our unconscious responses to events in everyday life and
the legal process.2 9 Its effects are especially pernicious in the ways
that social science is accepted or rejected in the formulation of a
mental disability law jurisprudence. 0

Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433, 442 (1992). See
id. at 444 (noting that these findings "have especially important implications for the
study of commitment hearings").
' See Petrila, supranote 19, at 905 ("Until these issues are confronted directly.
in therapeutic jurisprudence.. . the promise that the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence
has for reinvigorating mental disability law will go unrealized."); Joel Haycock, Speaking
Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,and MassachusettsMental Health
Law, 20 NEw ENO. J. Civ. & ChuM. CONFINEMENT (forthcoming 1993) ("[IFhe success
of therapeutic jurisprudence will depend in part on the degree to which it empowers the
objects of therapeutic and judicial attention.").
2 Perlin, Sanism, supra note 25, at 374.
' Id. at 375; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense:
"Ordinary Common Sense" and HeuristicReasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3, 7 (1990).
" See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 10 (examining Supreme Court cases
in order to determine the extent of domination of sanist behavior in cases concerning
civil commitment, the right to refuse medication, and criminal prosecutions).
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"Pretextuality" refers to courts' acceptance, either implicitly
or explicitly, of testimonial dishonesty and their decisions to engage
in dishonest and even sometimes meretricious decisionmaking in
mental disability law cases. This pretextuality infects all participants
in the system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
participants and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging and, at
times, perjurious testimony. 1
These constructs need to be considered in the context of any
therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry, since, unless we determine why the
law has developed as it has, it will make little difference if we
determine whether it is developing in a "therapeutically correct" way.
In short, even if the legal system were to come to grips with all
therapeutic jurisprudence issues in all aspects of mental disability
law, these additional inquiries will still be required. While I am thus
convinced that "therapeutic jurisprudence" is an absolutely essential
tool to be used in the reconstruction of mental disability law, we must
not fail to place it within the social/political context of why and how
mental disability law has developed, and what conscious and
unconscious motivations have contributed to the law's development
in order for it to truly illuminate the underlying system.
II. This Symposium Issue
The papers in this Symposium reflect the growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence as a maturing academic discipline. They
employ therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of illuminating,
variously, individual cases involving mentally disabled litigants32 by
analyzing the systemic way in which such individuals are dealt with
by the judiciary in two important inquiries (commitment status and

31See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 25, at 628-39 (explaining
"pretextuality"); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PsYcHIATRY & L. 131 (1991) (discussing the gulf between legal and mental
health professionals and the resulting consequences on mental health law which is created
when the perspectives of the two different disciplines collide).
32See Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the Criminal Trial Process: The

Constitutional and Therapeutic Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. Sc.
HUM. RTS. 637 (1993) (this issue).

J.
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the refusal of antipsychotic medication). 3 They use therapeutic
jurisprudence as a means of exploring how administrative agencies
(jails and prisons) treat mentally disabled persons, 4 and how legal
rules affect the practice of therapy." They examine other areas of
the law beyond mental disability questions, including the tort
compensation system36 and the federal sentencing guidelines,37 using
tools of analysis shaped and formed by therapeutic jurisprudence.
Moreover, these papers suggest how therapeutic jurisprudence can
and does affect all forensic mental health practice,3" and how it can
be employed to illuminate aspects of the entire legal system. 9 When
taken together, they provide the reader with a level of insight into
therapeutic jurisprudence in a way that has never before been
presented in one discrete law journal Symposium issue.
The range of these papers is important for several reasons.
First, it demonstrates that therapeutic jurisprudence is not and cannot
be simply an elaborate academic justification for a return to the
"therapeutic state. "I Therapeutic jurisprudence has not developed as
a means by which mental health professionals can avoid legal
accountability or by which civil libertarian principles can be
subverted.
As Dorfman's paper underscores, a therapeutic

33Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic JurisprudenceFilter: Fear and
Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 805 (1993) (this
issue).
' Fred Cohen & Joel A. Dvoskin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:A Glimpse, 10
N.Y.L. SC. J. HUM. RTS. 777 (1993) (this issue).
35Murray Levine, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of MandatedReporting of
ChildMaltreatment by Psychotherapists,10 N.Y.L. Sc. J. HUM. RTs. 711 (1993) (this
issue).
Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World a Better Place Through Tort Law: Through
the TherapeuticJurisprudenceLooking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 739 (1993)
(this issue).
37Ken A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed or
Acquitted Crimes: Do the FederalSentencing Guidelines Promote Respectfor the Law?,
10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835 (1993) (this issue).
3 Robert L. Sadoff, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A View From a Forensic
Psychiatrist, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs. 825 (1993) (this issue).
39David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Law/Mental
Health Scholarship Outside the Conventional Context of Mental Health Law, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J.HUM. RTs. 759 (1993) (this issue).
40See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence inquiry will force us to "step[ ] back from our
treatment choices and assess[ ] why we are making them." in an
effort to determine if society is really being driven by purported
therapeutic outcomes rather than the need to "relieve the anxieties the
mentally ill provoke in us." 4 In the same vein, Winick's article
demonstrates how decisions such as Riggins v. Nevada,42 which
effectively expand the right to refuse treatment by implicitly focusing
on the nature of choice in the construction of a treatment calculus,
will set up "expectancies of positive outcomes that predictably will
increase patient motivation and treatment compliance, which in turn
enhances the chances that treatment will be successful."4 3
Second, it shows how therapeutic jurisprudence can be
employed as a servant of law reform, by illuminating the therapeutic
and anti-therapeutic affects of rules that drive behavior in other
institutional and litigational systems. Cohen and Dvoskin's paper
demonstrates how careful consideration of the empirical data that has
developed about jail suicides could lead judicial decisionmakers to
reconsider the appropriate liability standards in subsequent tort
cases.' Looking at a very different system, Shuman concludes that
there is a common agenda shared by tort law and therapeutic
jurisprudence,4 5 and raises provocative questions that tort scholars
need to consider in the continued development of tort/compensation
jurisprudence.4 6 In and of itself, the consistent showing of an
association of a reduction of post-accident pathology with "a shorter
time between accident and settlement, a longer time after the
settlement of the lawsuit, and having less severe symptomatology
after [the] accident"''
suggests the importance of therapeutic
jurisprudence to the tort law.
Third, it demonstrates how therapeutic jurisprudence can be
a powerful interpretive tool to make vivid the stories of individuals

41 Dorfman, supra note 33, at 824.
42 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

4 Winick, supra note 32, at 704.
Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 34, part IV.
4S Shuman, supra note 36, at 758.
4Id.

at 741-42, 755-56.

'7 Id. at 757. (quoting Ren6e Binder et al, Is Money a Cure? A Follow-Up of

Litigants in England, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 151, 152 (1991)).
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in other areas of the law. Gould's examination of the aspect of the
federal sentencing guidelines that permits departure from presumptive
sentencing terms when the defendant "turns rat" by becoming an
informant48 takes therapeutic jurisprudence into new and totally
unchartered waters. The questions that she asks provide an important
research agenda for sophisticated criminal law scholars and
empiricists.49 Similarly, Levine's empirical analysis of the impact of
mandatory child abuse reporting by therapists demonstrates the
complexity and ambiguity of the underlying issues, and shows how
a law written with an ostensibly therapeutic purpose ° can cause
feelings of anger and betrayal on the part of therapists and
subsequently result in significantly anti-therapeutic outcomes."1
Finally, the papers contextualize these developments in two
very different but complimentary ways: within the world of forensic
mental health law practice, and within the larger legal process.
Wexler provides another enticing menu of alternative legal and
behavioral areas which cry out for therapeutic jurisprudence analysis.
Here, he explicitly calls for "expanding the reach of therapeutic
jurisprudence beyond the conventional contours of mental disability
law" so as to serve as an eventual "instrument of law reform. "52
Sadoff considers the entire school of therapeutic jurisprudence from
the important perspective of practicing forensic psychiatrists (although
his insights are equally applicable to the other mental health
professions as well) and demonstrates how therapeutic jurisprudence
inquiries must extend far beyond the mental disability law borders.53
This perspective forces us to consider a reality that is too often

' See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4§ 5Kl.1 (West Supp. 1993); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). On the
relationship between the Guidelines and a defendant's mental disability, see 1 PERLIN,
supra note 1, § 16.18A (Supp. 1993).
4'See Gould, supra note 37, at 841-42.
50 See, e.g., N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 413.1 (McKinney 1993) (imposing duty on
health professionals to report suspected child abuse and instances of maltreatment). See
generally Margaret Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20
FAM. L.Q. 141 (1986) (inaccurate reports of child abuse can violate privacy of family,
disrupt family relations, stigmatize child care providers and expose children to
unnecessary court appearances and physical and psychological examinations).
11Levine, supra note 35, part VI.
52 Wexler, New Directions, supra note 14, at 775.
51Sadoff, supra note 38.
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glossed over in all legal scholarship: that therapeutic jurisprudence
will also restructure the contours of forensic testimony as well as the
contours of the relationship between fact-finders and expert witnesses,
a relationship which is already shaped to a large extent by
constitutional dictates, statutory limitations, and self-imposed
professional restrictions on expertise.'

III. Conclusion
At the conference at which these papers were presented, a
member of the audience said, "I wish you guys (sic) had a different
name for this." He explained later that what he meant was this: That
therapeutic jurisprudence sounded too "therapeutic" and not
sufficiently "jurisprudential." I demurred to his comment at that time,
but have given it much thought over the intervening four months. I
understand his concern and agree wholeheartedly with his basic
position-that therapeutic must not be used as a rationale to support
a return to the days of the "hands off" policy in which courts
unthinkingly and inevitably deferred to the expertise of institutional
keepers 5 and in which treatment questions were seen as
nonjusticiable.56 Perhaps not coincidentally, this is the position that
Justice Thomas, the member of the court with the fewest insights into
therapeutic issues and mental health concepts, seems ominously the
most comfortable with. 7 On the other hand, if therapeutic
jurisprudence is used in the ways that it is employed in the papers in

- See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic
Relationships, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 111, 114 (1991); Committee on Ethical Guidelines
for Forensic Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1991).
SS See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975) ("Where
'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly
unacceptableto suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted
ground is present.") (emphasis added).
57 See, e.g., Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 10, at 58-61; Perlin, Decoding, supra
note 9, at 174 (discussing the sanist and pretextual nature of Justice Thomas' dissents in
Riggins and Foucha); 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 14.20A (Supp. 1993) (discussing Justice
Thomas' majority opinion in Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993)).
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this symposium-as a tool for exposing pretextuality,58 as a means
of integrating concepts born in mental disability law into other areas
of jurisprudence,59 as a means of revealing the unexpected
"litigational side-effects"6 of a seemingly-benign anti-child abuse
law,61 as a means of insuring that therapeutic jurisprudence inquiries
retain their constitutional moorings, 62 and as a means of attacking and
uprooting "the we/they distinction that has traditionally plagued and
stigmatized the mentally disabled" 63-then that result will be
therapeutic for the legal system, for the development of mental
disability law jurisprudence, and ultimately, for all of us.

See Dorfman, supra note 33.
See Gould, supra note 37; Shuman, supra note 36.
o See Perlin, Decoding, supra note 9, at 166 (discussing this concept in the context
of Riggins).
61See Levine, supra note 35.
See Winick, supra note 32.
See Wexler, New Directions, supra note 776.

